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ABSTRACT 
The global road toll is estimated to be about 1 million fatalities each year, with the majority 
occurring in less motorised countries.  As these countries motorise, sometimes quite rapidly, 
this figure is expected to rise.  The transfer of road safety knowledge and expertise from 
highly motorised countries to less motorised countries is advocated by international agencies 
such as the World Health Organisation; however, the mixed successes of road safety transfer 
efforts are also acknowledged.   
 
This paper presents a ‘road safety space’ model and method for improving road safety 
transfer, based on research conducted in two Southeast Asian countries.  The model 
recognises that road safety problems and countermeasures are influenced by factors which lie 
outside the immediate context, both in the recipient country and in the country in which a 
particular countermeasure has proven to be effective.  A method is outlined for the 
documentation and analysis of these factors, to enable a more considered approach to road 
safety transfer and a greater likelihood of success.  The results of case studies of the approach 
are presented as an example of the method in action, and ways of improving the method 
further are discussed. 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Countries can be classified according to income level (low/middle/high income, e.g. World 
Health Organisation, 2004), level of motorisation (less motorised/highly motorised, e.g. 
Mohan and Tiwari, 1998), or economic development (developed nations/developing 
countries/transitional economies/newly industrialised economies, e.g. Asian Development 
Bank 1998b; Jacobs et al, 2000).  These classification systems overlap to a large extent, such 
that highly motorised countries are usually those with high incomes and developed 
economies.   
Countries also differ in terms of road safety.  The road safety picture is better in highly 
motorised countries (Jacobs et al, 2000; Mackay, 2000; World Health Organisation, 2004; 
Commission for Global Road Safety, 2006), which account for a minority (10-16 per cent) of 
the estimated annual global road traffic toll of 0.75-1.2 million fatalities and 23-50 million 
injuries (Jacobs et al, 2000; World Health Organisation, 2004; Commission for Global Road 
Safety, 2006).   
Global road traffic fatalities are predicted to rise to somewhere between 1 million and 2.34 
million by 2020 overall (Murray and Lopez, 1996; Jacobs et al, 2000; Kopits and Cropper, 
2003, cited World Health Organisation, 2004).  Less motorised countries – on top of their 
majority share of fatalities – are expected to show the greatest proportional increase in road 
 
fatalities and injuries (Murray and Lopez, 1996), especially those in Africa and the 
Asia/Pacific region (Jacobs et al, 2000).   
In response to this large and increasing problem, the World Health Organisation has 
recommended that: 
“In developing countries…the priority should be given to the import and adaptation 
of proven and promising methods from developed nations, and a pooling of 
information as to their effectiveness among other low-income countries.”  (World 
Health Organisation, 2004:12) 
The transfer of road safety knowledge and expertise from highly motorised countries to 
less motorised countries is also endorsed by the Commission for Global Road Safety (2006), 
although the Commission emphasises the need for local capacity building.  Such an approach 
is designed to avoid simplistic and hasty attempts at transfer.  In a similar vein, researchers 
from the UK’s Transport Research Laboratory (which has considerable experience in road 
safety transfer) make the following cautionary remark: 
“The numerous success stories of the developed nations cannot be simply implanted 
and implemented in these [developing] countries and, as a result, tackling the 
problem will require innovative research.” (Davis et al, 2003:vii) 
This paper describes an approach to the transfer of road safety knowledge and expertise 
which has been applied in two case studies of road safety transfer in Southeast Asia.  It is 
drawn from doctoral research conducted by the author (King, 2005).  It is based on a concept 
termed the road safety space, and involves taking a structured approach to road safety transfer 
which should improve the effectiveness of the transfer process. 
 
2 THE ‘ROAD SAFETY SPACE’ MODEL 
The ‘Road Safety Space’ model is an ecological approach to road safety transfer which was 
developed in the course of research into the factors which contribute to the success of transfer 
of road safety measures shown to work in Western countries to less motorised countries in 
Asia (King, 2005).  While transfer of road safety knowledge and expertise from highly 
motorised countries to less motorised countries is recommended (as noted above), little 
attention has been devoted to the process whereby transfer efforts should take place.  The 
literature was searched for best practice approaches to road safety transfer, focusing in 
particular on experiences in Asia.  The lack of literature in this area meant that the net was 
spread wide, ultimately including around 40 sources ranging from those which dealt with 
quite specific road safety measures and road user groups (e.g. the black spot treatments in 
Baguley and Mustafa, 1996), up to very broad approaches (e.g. the broad injury approach in 
Peden et al, 2001).   
No evaluations of the transfer process were reported as having been conducted, and there 
were relatively few evaluations of the success of transferring particular road safety measures 
themselves.  Instead, the references made recommendations as to the kinds of road safety 
measures which should be introduced, i.e. a list of best practice road safety measures, as 
opposed to identifying best practice for transferring road safety measures, i.e. ensuring that 
the transfer process provides the greatest opportunity for the road safety measure to succeed.  
At best, the indirect accounts of road safety transfer used in these sources constituted a 
‘recommended practice’ approach, not ‘best practice’ (King, 2005). 
A common element across these sources was the recognition (partial in some cases) that 
the context is important, i.e. that there are factors in the recipient country which will influence 
the success of road safety transfer.  A detailed analysis of these ‘recommended practice’ 
documents was undertaken in order to abstract the contextual factors which were explicitly or 
implicitly considered to have an influence on the success of transfer of road safety measures.  
 
The factors which emerged could be classified as economic, institutional, and social and 
cultural.  It is important to note that these factors are not mutually exclusive.  The rationale for 
the categories chosen was to some extent arbitrary (since there are other ways of classifying 
them), although this particular classification has some advantage:   
• The economic arena can bring into consideration resource constraints on road safety 
transfer as well as global economic and aid relationships, which are relevant to road 
safety transfer through the role of the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank.   
• Institutional issues deal with the organisation of road safety and its implementation, 
i.e. the way resources are managed and the structures involved.  This has much to do 
with the formal relationships between structures involved in, or influencing, delivery 
of road safety, and with the practical issues stemming from how agencies work. 
• Social and cultural factors are less formal, and apply more broadly to all road users.  
‘Culture’ is a term which is widely used but vaguely defined, and it was considered 
that combining ‘social’ with ‘cultural’ factors would avoid the need for semantic 
distinctions about what does and does not constitute ‘culture’, while still capturing a 
sense of shared values, attitudes and behaviours. 
People who work in institutions have social and cultural characteristics which influence the 
functioning of the institutions, just as institutional characteristics influence how funds are 
spent on road safety, and economic characteristics influence how road users react to road 
safety issues.  Such an overlap cannot be avoided, and indeed should be recognised explicitly. 
The factors were also classified in terms of how broadly they apply (according to the 
recommended practice literature): globally or in relations between a government and outside 
governments and organisations; nationally or mostly nationally, applying outside the transport 
sector as well as within it; to the transport sector outside road safety; and to road safety.  
Table 1 (an edited version of a table in King, 2005) provides examples drawn from the 
documents.  
 
Table 1:  Examples of contextual factors from recommended practice documents  
 
 Economic Institutional Social and cultural 
Global Macroeconomic situation 
International business or 
aid constraints  
International business or 
aid constraints  
 
National Economic development/ 
national 
wealth/productivity 
Private sector capability 
Policy and legal 
framework 
Institutional capacity/ 
capability and 
commitment  
Social conditions 
Power relations 
Transport Motorisation 
 
Road 
infrastructure/facilities  
Financial and technical 
resources, expertise and 
training needs  
Proportion of non-
motorised road users 
Existing perceptions 
Road 
safety 
Road safety spending 
compared with other 
transport spending 
Organisational funding 
specifically available for 
road safety 
Relative priority of road 
safety  
Road safety 
organisational 
infrastructure  
 
Historical context and 
social acceptability of 
legislation and 
enforcement 
Cultural definitions  
 
 
Developing a model to incorporate these contextual factors in a meaningful way presents 
two main challenges.  The first is the need to account for macro-micro linkages, for example, 
how globalisation might affect the wearing of motorcycle helmets within a country.  The 
second challenge is the need to bring such a diverse range of factors within a single 
framework.  A number of theoretical perspectives were canvassed for their possible 
applicability to road safety transfer, either directly or through adaptation.  They were drawn 
from the broad areas of development, anthropology, risk, globalisation, public health, injury 
control and community involvement.  None were found to capture both the macro-micro 
linkages required by a model of road safety transfer, and all the types of factors which need to 
be incorporated.  This pointed to the need for development of a hypothetical model of road 
safety transfer which could then be investigated. 
The starting point was the definition of the road safety space, a theoretical concept: Each 
road safety issue in a given country exists in a space defined by the economic, institutional, 
social and cultural factors which influence it. The factors include both broad and specific 
influences.  The road safety space varies from one road safety issue to another, and from 
country to country, although some factors may be shared across road safety issues or across 
countries.  
Figure 1 shows the model, with its three main categories of inputs.  The arrows between 
these three sets of factors represent their interactions with each other.  Each set of factors 
includes both macro and micro elements, and each interacts with the other.  The net effect of 
this web of influences and interactions in the road safety space is a set of road safety 
behaviours, practices and outcomes. 
 
 
 
Economic 
- globalisation 
- budget 
- income/poverty 
- fines 
−
Road Safety 
Behaviours, 
Practices & 
Outcomes
Social & cultural 
- social stratification 
- attitudes/beliefs 
- customs 
Institutional 
- legislation 
- governance 
- police role 
- crash data 
Figure 1:  Model of the ‘road safety space’ of contextual factors 
  
 
For example, signalised intersection crashes in a country have their own road safety space, 
comprising the economic, institutional, social and cultural factors which influence the 
incidence and severity of intersection crashes.  Economic factors could include low budgets 
for maintenance of signal equipment, and growing wealth among a middle class which leads 
to a surge in motorised traffic.  Institutional factors could include the lack of trained traffic 
engineers, the lack of staff dedicated to maintenance, and a low emphasis on traffic law 
enforcement.  Social and cultural factors could include entrenched road use behaviours based 
on experience with non-motorised road use, false beliefs about the safety of road use 
behaviours, and a lack of respect for laws and law enforcement not based on a moral code. 
It was stated above that the road safety space model is ecological.  Its development was 
influenced by a metaphor of biological adaptation, in which the road safety space in a 
particular country is conceived of as a kind of ecosystem.  The transfer of a road safety 
measure to the country in the hope of making an impact on the road safety problem is 
analogous to introducing an outside species in the hope of changing some of the features of 
the ecosystem.   
Using this metaphor, it can be seen that the success of the transfer will depend on several 
factors:  
• First, an understanding is needed of how the ‘ecosystem’ functions in producing the 
outcomes evident in it, that is, how the economic, institutional and social and cultural 
factors in the road safety space interact to produce the road safety behaviour, outcome 
or practice which is observed.   
• Second, an understanding is needed of how the ‘introduced organism’ functions, that 
is, how a road safety measure proposed for introduction generally operates; e.g. an 
enforcement measure usually relies on police operating at an appropriate level of 
activity, with particular kinds of equipment, appropriate legislative support and public 
education. 
• Third, a notion is needed about how the introduction of the new ‘species’ will change 
the pattern of relationships in the ‘ecosystem’; following on with the discussion of 
enforcement measures above, this would entail a judgment about how enforcement 
would affect public attitudes towards police and laws, whether it would be politically 
and financially sustainable given the factors operating in the road safety space, etc. 
 In terms of this biological metaphor, therefore, successful transfer of a road safety 
measure requires an understanding of how a country’s road safety space functions (for a 
particular road safety behaviour, outcome or practice), how the measure itself functions in its 
originating country, and how its introduction will interact with pre-existing road safety 
systems and phenomena. 
The process to be followed in road safety transfer, using the model, would be (for a given 
road safety behaviour, outcome or practice): 
1. Use the model to identify the contextual factors which influence the issue of interest. 
2. Nominate candidate countermeasures which have been shown to be effective in the 
West. 
3. Use the model to identify the contextual factors which influenced the success of these 
countermeasures. 
4. Determine whether – given the context in the recipient country – these 
countermeasures are likely to be successful as they stand, or only after adaptation to 
local conditions, or only if the local context can also be changed, or not at all. 
The following sections briefly describe two case studies conducted to test the utility and 
feasibility of the road safety space model.  The aims of the research were to see whether the 
road safety space model would be useful in the process of road safety transfer, and whether it 
would be feasible to employ it in the field, given the need for collection of information.   
 
 
3 USING THE ‘ROAD SAFETY SPACE’ MODEL: CASE STUDIES 
Two case studies were undertaken in two Southeast Asian countries.  The first case involved 
the development and implementation of a road safety education course by foreign consultants 
(the transfer agents) with funding through the World Bank.  The second involved the 
implementation of a range of initiatives aimed at increasing helmet wearing, conducted by a 
non-government organisation (the transfer agents) with close government links, funded 
mainly by international philanthropic organisations, with staff being either local or with long 
experience in the country.   
The focus on the local contexts for each transfer and the extrapolation of the results to 
general conclusions about the road safety space model are both particularly suitable for a case 
study approach (Bloyce, 2004; Stake, 2005).  This kind of study is classified by Stake (2005) 
as an instrumental case study, where the interest in the case is not so much the particulars of 
the case itself, but the information the case can provide about some other issue, in this case 
the feasibility and utility of the road safety space model.  A retrospective case study approach 
is taken here because there was no possibility of setting up a transfer purely for the purposes 
of testing the model, so existing transfer efforts had to be used.  This is a strength, in that the 
risk of artificiality is avoided.  In addition, this research is focused on the processes followed 
by the transfer agents, for which a case study approach is well suited (Denscombe, 1998, cited 
Bloyce, 2004). 
Ideally, the model would have been applied to a new project from its conception through to 
its full implementation.  In practice, it was necessary to use the model in a semi-retrospective 
manner for projects which were already well under way.   
For each case there were three phases: 
1. Background research: establish a general picture of the road safety space from existing 
sources. 
2. Data collection:  
− in-depth interviews with key informants and others involved in the cases; 
− analysis of the content and themes in documents related to the cases; and 
− observations of the road use environment. 
3. Data analysis: 
− transcribe interviews, enter transcripts, notes on secondary sources and 
observations into files for analysis; 
− extract  themes relating to contextual factors from the data collection; 
− establish which contextual factors were known and/or taken into account; and 
− establish which contextual factors contributed to the success of transfer. 
Identification of key informants took place by snowballing, starting with the transfer 
agents.  A semi-structured questionnaire was developed, and was used mainly as an aide-
memoire to ensure basic issues were covered.  Some informants were interviewed more than 
once, and on separate visits more than a year apart.  Tape recording was initially planned, but 
replaced by note-taking on advice from project staff.   
Publications, presentations and other material generated by the project teams, about the 
development of the transfer project and in particular the problem analysis phase, were 
solicited from informants.  All material was examined for the acknowledgment of contextual 
factors and the actions taken to address identified factors, and cross-referenced with the 
interview material.  Observations were recorded on the transfer cases and the broader road use 
environment in the country.  Some observations were ‘passive’ and others ‘active’ (Spradley, 
1980).   
 
The data were analysed qualitatively with the assistance of NVivo (QSR International, 
2000).  A form of thematic analysis was employed.  The interview transcripts formed the 
primary data source, and the secondary sources and observations were analysed mainly for 
confirmatory or contradictory information, or to address questions which emerged from the 
interview data.  
 
4 RESULTS 
There is too much information to allow for a detailed exposition of the results, so examples 
will be cited, showing in one case the tabular representation of the road safety space analysis, 
and in the other case the diagrammatic representation. 
Table 2 presents the road safety space factors identified in the school education case 
through analysis of the themes which emerged from the transcripts, secondary sources and 
observations.  They are classified in several ways:  
− whether they are primarily economic, institutional, or social and cultural; how 
broad they are (which relates to the categories in Table 1);  
− the degree to which they overlap with other areas (e.g. economic overlapping 
with institutional);  
− whether the transfer agents knew about these influencing factors (9 for “yes” 
and 8 for “no”, 8/9 for “partially known”); and  
− whether they used the factors they knew about, i.e. whether they took into 
account (in the transfer process) the factors that they knew had an influence on 
the road safety issue of interest, in this case, road use behaviour of school 
children (9 for “yes” and 8 for “no”, 8/9 for “partially addressed”).  It is also 
noted that the transfer agents assumed the existence of several influencing 
factors which the author’s research did not support. 
The important points to note in Table 2 are that the use of the model led to the 
identification of influencing factors of which the transfer agents were not aware, or 
misperceived, and that the transfer agents were more successful in some areas than in others.   
Social and cultural factors stand out in this respect.  The research identified six social and 
cultural factors, only one of which the transfer agents were fully aware of (the need to shape 
the project for the local culture) and but which they addressed only partially.  There were two 
factors they were partially aware of (fatalistic behavioural explanations and complex language 
issues), and they addressed the language aspects they were aware of but not fatalism.   
More importantly, there were two misperceptions of social and cultural factors by the 
transfer agents which they acted upon: they believed that the family values in the country 
provided a good basis for the education approach they were taking, when evidence gathered in 
this research showed that family values were not conducive to encouraging safe behaviour; 
and they thought that a Western safety culture approach would be effective, whereas the 
research found that the behaviours considered safe in the West did not match those which 
were safe in the recipient country, and that there was a limited understanding in the country 
itself of what would be likely to influence behaviour.   
The finding that social and cultural factors were the main area of weakness probably 
reflects the fact that the transfer agents were foreign.  It should also be emphasised that they 
given a restrictive brief and limited time for the project, and that local cultural constraints 
meant that they were unlikely to be given feedback about any misconceptions they had.   
Overall, the transfer agents were successful in achieving the targets they set for the project, 
and the steps they took were in accordance with best practice in the West.  However, the road 
safety space model would have assisted them by providing better information about the 
factors which influence the behaviour of school children, and helped in the development of 
the school education program. 
 
 Factor Level Overlap Knew Used 
Constraining influence of national and regional economic 
changes 
Broad 
I  
9 2 
Low government prioritisation of road safety funding Mid-range I 9 9 
Low affordability of safety equipment Specific  2 - 
          Safety equipment affordable (misperception) Specific  9 9 
Unequal distribution of wealth/rural areas Broad/Mid S  9 2/9 
Ec
on
om
ic
 
Emphasis on the monetary value of safety Broad/Mid S 2 - 
 
Mixed value of the school education system context Specific  2 - 
          Good school education context (misperception) Specific  9 9 
Limited government commitment Broad E  9 2/9 
Lack of coordination across government agencies/ 
bureaucratic behaviour 
Broad/Mid 
S 
2 - 
Mixed value of rotation of senior positions Broad/Mid  2 - 
Central bureaucracy vs. regional receptivity Broad/Mid S  9 9 
Perceptions of police corruption Mid-range S 9 2 
In
st
itu
tio
na
l 
Low priority of traffic policing Mid/Specific S  9 2 
 
Fatalistic explanations of crashes and behaviour Broad  2/9 2 
Family values and style not oriented towards encouraging 
safe child behaviour 
Mid-range  2 - 
          Family values and style conducive to protective 
behaviours approach (misperception) 
Mid-range  9 9 
Western safety culture does not reflect safe behaviours in 
the country 
Mid/Specific  2 - 
          Concepts of Western safety culture and 
          behaviour can inform the project (misperception) 
Mid/Specific  9 9 
Limited understanding of the influences on road safety 
behaviour in the country 
Mid/Specific 
I 
 2 - 
Need to shape the project for the local culture Mid-range  9 2/9 
So
ci
al
 a
nd
 c
ul
tu
ra
l 
Complex language issues Broad  2/9 9 
 
Figure 2 presents a summary diagram of the road safety space in the motorcycle helmet 
case.  It is a way of presenting the same information as in the tables in a spatial form, which 
provides a more convenient way of illustrating where the influencing factors lie with respect 
to breadth and the overlap between categories.   
Unlike the school education case, where the transfer agents missed eight factors 
completely and two partially, it can be seen that in the motorcycle helmet case the transfer 
agents missed only two factors.  However, in the school education case the transfer agents 
took account of almost all the factors known to them, while in the motorcycle helmet case 
about half the factors they were aware of were not addressed. 
Table 2:  Road safety space factors for school education case, breadth/specificity, overlap 
with other factors, known and/or used by transfer agents 
 
 
  
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL 
Gov’t sensitive to negative 
community reactions 
Low fine discourages 
corruption, fosters 
enforcement
Lack of 
economic 
incentives to 
enforce helmet 
wearing 
HELMET 
PURCHASE 
AND 
WEARING 
Low helmet 
affordability and 
lack of incentives 
to purchase 
General economic 
improvement 
associated with 
increasing 
motorisation 
Limited 
availability of 
international 
aid funds 
Reduced 
NTSC access 
to funds for 
road safety 
High commitment 
to road safety at 
the national level 
Formal authority behind 
regulations determines 
community willingness 
to comply 
Law passed will 
be decreed
Predominance 
of provincial 
over national 
priorities for 
road safety 
Low priority 
of traffic 
policing 
Perceptions 
of police 
corruption 
Ineffective motorcycle 
training and licensing 
requirements 
Poor 
crash 
reporting 
Low road 
safety 
emphasis 
in schools 
Low 
compliance 
with traffic 
regulations 
Universal 
helmet law will 
be complied 
with
Attitude that road 
use requires no 
special knowledge 
or training 
Negative perceptions of 
helmets 
Fatalism and other 
cultural factors 
counteract safety 
messages 
Key:  
 
Bold   Not known by transfer agents 
             Known, not used 
             Known and used 
             Incorrectly assumed and used  
             Part known, not used 
             Known, part used 
             Part unknown, used known part 
             (Links misperceived and “correct” factor) 
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONAL 
Figure 2: Composite view of road safety space in the motorcycle helmet case 
 The high level of knowledge of factors in the road safety space probably reflects the fact 
that the transfer agents were either local or had been living in the country for many years.  
This is clearly a benefit of using local input in the project design and implementation itself, 
rather than through management of consultants.   
There were three factors which were misperceived by the transfer agents, one in each 
category.  Two of the misperceived factors (assumption about the effect of the fine for not 
wearing a helmet, and potential compliance with a universal helmet law) lie firmly within the 
knowledge base of road safety practitioners who deal with compliance and deterrence, and 
their misperception may be attributable to the fact that the transfer agents in this case did not 
come from such a background.  Their areas of expertise were in marketing (in the broad sense 
of the word) and in negotiation with government, and they were very successful at these 
elements of the project.  The other misperceived factor (the assumption that the passing of a 
law would result in its decree) was only evident when the history of government in the 
country was considered, and this may have been outside the knowledge of the transfer agents. 
The low rate at which the transfer agents addressed the factors they were aware of is not 
easy to account for.  However, it again illustrates the potential of the road safety space 
approach in identifying factors which should be taken into account.   
 
5 DISCUSSION 
The purpose of the research was not to evaluate the success or failure of the road safety 
measures being transferred, or even to evaluate the success or failure of the transfer process 
(which has subtly different implications), but to assess whether the ‘road safety space’ model 
was both feasible and useful.  
The outline of the results in the preceding section provides good evidence that the road 
safety space model is useful.   
In the education case, the road use situation and locally accepted practices could have been 
taken into account more, and the use of the model would have identified a number of factors 
of which the transfer agents were not aware.  Many of these would have been missed due to a 
lack of detailed local knowledge, which the approach would have assisted with.   
In the helmet case, the transfer agents were aware of most of the factors, but did not 
address about half of them.  The use of the road safety space model would have made it clear 
that they needed to address these additional factors.  It would also have raised issues about the 
expertise of the transfer agents, indicating the areas in which subject matter knowledge could 
have been sought from road safety practitioners.   
With respect to the feasibility of the approach, it was clear that a lot of background 
information on the recipient country would be needed.   In both cases this involved gathering 
information about history, social structure, government, economics and culture which are not 
generally among the sources consulted by road safety practitioners.  The scale of the task 
would be expected to reduce over time, however, all other things being equal: although the 
road safety space for one road safety issue in a country will not be entirely the same as for 
another road safety issue in the same country, there would undoubtedly be an overlap.  This 
means that once a sufficient information base had been developed for a country, the size of 
the task for each new transfer project would be reduced.  There would still be a need to 
commit time and resources to groundwork, which should be justified by the potential benefits 
of more effective road safety transfer.     
Some other issues emerged.  Returning to the metaphor of biological adaptation, and the 
steps outlined for the use of the road safety space model, it is considered necessary that there 
is an understanding of how the road safety measure to be transferred functions in the country 
of origin.  In the course of the case studies it became clear that, while there was a general 
understanding of the context in the originating country, it was not a focused or even a 
 coherent understanding, and that a road safety space analysis for the originating country 
should be a necessary precursor to transfer.   
This in turn raised other issues such as timing and geography.  If the aim is to introduce 
compulsory helmet wearing because it works in Australia, it might be more important to look 
at the Australian context when helmets were first made compulsory, rather than the current 
context.  However, compulsory helmet wearing was introduced in Australia some decades 
ago, and was not well documented in the scanty road safety literature of the time (which is 
mostly ‘grey’ literature in any case).   
Similarly, school education on road safety has been introduced in every Australian State.  
It is unclear as to whether any Australian State could be used to provide information of a 
context in which the measure works, or only the Australian State which is (or was, at the time 
of introduction of the school education intervention) most similar to the recipient country – if 
that is indeed realistic.   
If one looks beyond the Australian experience, these considerations of timing and 
geography multiply.  While the road safety space model provides a promising approach to 
improving transfer, there is a need for further exploration of how best to apply it.  
  
6 CONCLUSION 
Use of the road safety space model is an ecological approach to improving road safety 
transfer.  The research described above is mainly exploratory in nature, although an attempt 
has been made to test the practicality of the road safety space model, in terms of its feasibility 
and usefulness.  The case study results show that the road safety space model should be 
feasible and useful, and would become easier with the accumulation of better knowledge in 
some areas.  For example, the explicit use of the road safety space model in a transfer effort 
would provide information on the country involved which would be relevant to further 
transfers.   
The effectiveness of the model would be enhanced by the systematic development of 
information on road user behaviour in different countries as well, as this appears to be a 
significant gap in knowledge.  Application of the road safety space model is therefore justified 
as part of an ongoing research and development process.  An important limitation of this 
research is its retrospective nature.  Future research should be prospective, to provide a better 
test of the value of the model.  The findings of this research are relevant to road safety transfer 
in other less motorised regions of the world, and may also be relevant to issues of transfer for 
areas other than road safety, in particular public health and traffic engineering. 
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